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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-159
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WILLIAM BARNHILL, PETITIONER v. ELLIOT
JOHNSON, TRUSTEE
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit
[March 25, 1992]

  The Chief Justice  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Under the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance
section, 11 U. S. C. 547, the trustee is permitted to
recover, with certain exceptions, transfers of property made
by the debtor within 90 days before the date the bankruptcy
petition was filed.  We granted certiorari to decide whether,
in determining if a transfer occurred within the 90-day
preference period, a transfer made by check should be
deemed to occur on the date the check is presented to the
recipient or on the date the drawee bank honors it.  We
hold that the latter date is determinative.
  The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute.  The
debtor made payment for a bona fide debt to petitioner
Barnhill.  The check was delivered to petitioner on Novem-
ber 18.  The check was dated November 19, and the check
was honored by the drawee bank on November 20.  The
debtor later filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.  It is
agreed by the parties that the 90th day before the bank-
ruptcy filing was November 20.
  Respondent Johnson was appointed trustee for the
bankruptcy estate.  He filed an adversary proceeding
against petitioner, claiming that the check payment was
recoverable by the estate pursuant to 11 U. S. C. 547(b).
That section generally permits the trustee to recover for
benefit of the bankruptcy estate transfers of the debtor's
property made within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing.
Respondent asserted that the transfer occurred on Novem-
ber 20, the date the check was honored by the drawee bank,
and therefore was within the 90-day period.  Petitioner
defended by claiming that the transfer occurred on Novem-
ber 18, the date he received the check (the so-called ``date
of delivery'' rule), and that it therefore fell outside the 90-
day period established by 547(b)(4)(A).
The Bankruptcy Court concluded that a date of delivery
rule should govern and therefore denied the trustee
recovery.  The trustee appealed and the District Court
affirmed.  The trustee then appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,
concluding that a date of honor rule should govern actions
under 547(b).  In re Antweil, 931 F. 2d 689 (1991).  It
distinguished a prior decision, In re White River Corp., 799
F. 2d 631 (1986), in which it held that, for purposes of
547(c), a date of delivery rule should govern when a
transfer occurs.  The Tenth Circuit concluded that 547(b)
and 547(c) have different purposes and functions, justify-
ing different rules for each.  It further concluded that a date
of honor rule was appropriate because such a rule was
consistent with provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
was capable of easier proof, and was less subject to manipu-
lation.  We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split.
502 U. S. ____ (1991).
In relevant part, 547(b) provides:
``(b)  Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,
the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property -
  .      .       .      .      .
``(4) made -
  ``(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the fil-
  ing of the petition . . . .''
Title 11 U. S. C. 101(54) (1988 ed., Supp. II) defines
``transfer'' to mean
``every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting
with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure
of the debtor's equity of redemption.''
Section 547(e) provides further guidance on the meaning
and dating of a transfer.  For purposes of 547, it provides
``[(e)(1)](B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than
real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple
contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior
to the interest of the transferee.
``[(e)](2) For the purposes of this section, except as pro-
vided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is
made-
``(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is
perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time;
``(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such
transfer is perfected after such 10 days . . . .''
Our task, then, is to determine whether, under the defini-
tion of transfer provided by 101(54), and supplemented by
547(e), the  transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid can be
said to have occurred before November 20.
``What constitutes a transfer and when it is complete'' is
a matter of federal law.  McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323
U. S. 365, 369-370 (1945).  This is unsurprising since, as
noted above, the statute itself provides a definition of
``transfer.''  But that definition in turn includes references
to parting with ``property and interests in property.''  In the
absence of any controlling federal law, ``property'' and
``interests in property'' are creatures of state law.  Id., at
370; Butner v. United States, 440 U. S. 48, 54 (1979)
(``Congress has generally left the determination of property
rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law'').
Thus it is helpful to sketch briefly the rights and duties
enjoyed under state law by each party to a check transaction.
A person with an account at a bank enjoys a claim
against the bank for funds in an amount equal to the
account balance.  Under the U. C. C., a check is simply an
order to the drawee bank to pay the sum stated, signed by
the maker and payable on demand.  U. C. C. 3-104(1),
(2)(b), 2 U. L. A. 224 (1991).  Receipt of a check does not,
however, give the recipient a right against the bank.  The
recipient may present the check but, if the drawee bank
refuses to honor it, the recipient has no recourse against
the drawee.  U. C. C. 3-409(1), 2A U. L. A. 189 (1991).
That is not to say, however, that the recipient of a check
is without any rights.  Receipt of a check for an underlying
obligation suspends the obligation ``pro tanto until the
instrument['s] . . . presentment[;] . . . discharge of the
underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges him
on the obligation.'' U. C. C. 3-802(1)(b), 2A U. L. A. 514
(1991).  But should the drawee bank refuse to honor a
check, a cause of action against the drawer of the check
accrues to the recipient of a check ``upon demand following
dishonor of the instrument.''  U. C. C. 3-122(3), 2 U. L. A.
407 (1991); see also, U. C. C. 3-413(2), 2A U. L. A. 208
(1991).  And the recipient of a dishonored check, received in
payment on an underlying obligation, may maintain an
action on either the check or on the obligation.  U. C. C.
3-802(1)(b), 2A U. L. A. 514 (1991).
With this background we turn to the issue at hand.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
ignoring the interest that passed from the debtor to the
petitioner when the check was delivered on a date outside
the 90-day preference period.  We disagree.  We begin by
noting that there can be no assertion that an unconditional
transfer of the debtor's interest in property had occurred
before November 20.  This is because, as just noted above,
receipt of a check gives the recipient no right in the funds
held by the bank on the drawer's account.  Myriad events
can intervene between delivery and presentment of the
check that would result in the check being dishonored.  The
drawer could choose to close the account.  A third party
could obtain a lien against the account by garnishment or
other proceedings.  The bank might mistakenly refuse to
honor the check.
The import of the preceding discussion for the instant
case is that no transfer of any part of the debtor's claim
against the bank occurred until the bank honored the check
on November 20.  The drawee bank honored the check by
paying it.  U. C. C. 1-201(21) (defining honor), 1 U. L. A.
65 (1989); U. C. C. 4-213(a), 2B U. L. A. 222 (1991).  At
that time, the bank had a right to ``charge'' the debtor's
account, U. C. C. 4-401, 2B U. L. A. 307 (1991) - i.e., the
debtor's claim against the bank was reduced by the amount
of the check - and petitioner no longer had a claim against
the debtor.  Honoring the check, in short, left the debtor in
the position that it would have occupied if it had withdrawn
cash from its account and handed it over to petitioner.  We
thus believe that when the debtor has directed the drawee
bank to honor the check and the bank has done so, the
debtor has implemented a "mode, direct or indirect . . . of
disposing of property or an interest in property."
11 U. S. C. 101(54) (emphasis added).  For the purposes of
payment by ordinary check, therefore, a "transfer" as
defined by 101(54) occurs on the date of honor, and not
before.  And since it is undisputed that honor occurred
within the 90-day preference period, the trustee presump-
tively may avoid this transfer.
In the face of this argument, petitioner retreats to the
definition of ``transfer'' contained in 101(54).  Petitioner
urges that rather than viewing the transaction as involving
two distinct actions - delivery of the check, with no
interest in property thereby being transferred, and honoring
of the check, with an interest being transferred - that we
instead should view delivery of the check as a ``conditional''
transfer.  We acknowledge that 101(54) adopts an expan-
sive definition of transfer, one that includes ``every mode
. . . absolute or conditional . . . of disposing of or parting
with property or with an interest in property.''  There is
thus some force in petitioner's claim that he did, in fact,
gain something when he received the check.  But at most,
what petitioner gained was a chose in action against the
debtor.  Such a right, however, cannot fairly be character-
ized as a conditional right to ``property or an interest in
property,'' 101(54), where the property in this case is the
account maintained with the drawee bank.  For as noted
above, until the moment of honor the debtor retains full
control over disposition of the account and the account
remains subject to a variety of actions by third parties.  To
treat petitioner's nebulous right to bring suit as a ``condi-
tional transfer'' of the property would accomplish a near-
limitless expansion of the term ``conditional.''  In the
absence of any right against the bank or the account, we
think the fairer description is that petitioner had received
no interest in debtor's property, not that his interest was
``conditional.''
Finally, we note that our conclusion that no transfer of
property occurs until the time of honor is consistent with
547(e)(2)(A).  That section provides that a transfer occurs
at the time the transfer ``takes effect between the transferor
and the transferee . . . .''  For the reasons given above, and
in particular because the debtor in this case retained the
ability to stop payment on the check until the very last, we
do not think that the transfer of funds in this case can be
said to have ``taken effect between the debtor and peti-
tioner'' until the moment of honor.
Recognizing, perhaps, the difficulties in its position,
petitioner places his heaviest reliance not on the statutory
language but on accompanying legislative history.  Specifi-
cally, he points to identical statements from Representative
Edwards and Senator DeConcini that ``payment of a debt by
means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment, unless
the check is dishonored.  Payment is considered to be made
when the check is delivered for purposes of sections
547(c)(1) and (2).''  124 Cong. Rec. 32400, (1978) and id., at
34000.  We think this appeal to legislative history unavail-
ing.
     To begin, we note that appeals to statutory history are
well-taken only to resolve ``statutory ambiguity.''  Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U. S. ___ (1991) (slip op. at 5).  We do not
think this is such a case.  But even if it were, the state-
ments on which petitioner relies, by their own terms, apply
only to 547(c), not 547(b).  Section 547(c), in turn,
establishes various exceptions to 547(b)'s general rule
permitting recovery of preferential transfers.  Subsection
(c)(1) provides an exception for transfers that are  part of a
contemporaneous exchange of new value between a debtor
and creditor; subsection (c)(2) provides an exception for
transfers made from debtor to creditor in the ordinary
course of business.  These sections are designed to encour-
age creditors to continue to deal with troubled debtors on
normal business terms by obviating any worry that a
subsequent bankruptcy filing might require the creditor to
disgorge as a preference an earlier received payment.  But
given this specialized purpose, we see no basis for conclud-
ing that the legislative history, particularly legislative
history explicitly confined by its own terms to 547(c),
should cause us to adopt a ``date of delivery'' rule for
purposes of 547(b).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is
                               Affirmed.